Ye Li, 2012-17 Columbia PhD, joined OSU in 2017
Ye Li, 2012-17 Columbia PhD, joined OSU in 2017
with Patrick Bolton, Neng Wang, and Jinqiang Yang, Oct. 2020
Abstract: We propose a dynamic theory of banking where deposits play the role of productive capital as in the classical Q-theory of investment for non-financial firms. A key conceptual innovation of our theory is that the stock of deposits cannot be perfectly controlled by the bank. Demand deposit accounts commit the bank to allow holders to withdraw or deposit funds at will. The resultant uncertainty in deposit flows exposes the bank to the risk of violating regulatory restrictions on leverage. Deposits create value for the bank except when it is close to hitting the leverage restrictions, because sudden deposit inflows can force the bank into costly equity issuance. We show that the bank is endogenously risk averse with respect to both the deposit flow risk and standard loan return risk. Our model predictions on dynamic bank valuation and asset-liability management are broadly consistent with the evidence. Moreover, our model lends itself to a quantitative evaluation of the costs and benefits of leverage regulations.
R&R at the American Economic Review, revised version, Jul. 2020
Abstract: Intangible-intensive firms in the U.S. hold an enormous amount of liquid assets that are in fact short-term debts issued by financial intermediaries. This paper builds a macro-finance model that captures this structure. A self-perpetuating savings glut emerges in equilibrium. As intangibles become increasingly important for production, firms hoard more liquidity to finance investments in intangibles with limited pledgeability. The resulting low interest rates induce intermediaries to increase leverage and bid up asset prices, which in turn encourages firms to invest more and hoard even more liquidity to fund expansion. Along these secular trends, endogenous risk accumulates in the financial system.
Selected presentations: CEPR ESSFM Gerzensee, Cornell Johnson, CUHK,European Finance Association (EFA), European Winter Finance Summit (Best Paper Award), HKUST Annual Macro Workshop,
SUFE, Temple Fox, U Calgary (Haskayne), Western Finance Association (WFA)
with Lin Will Cong, Neng Wang, Accepted at the Review of Financial Studies, Jul. 2020
Abstract: We develop a dynamic asset-pricing model of cryptocurrencies/tokens that allow users to conduct peer-to-peer transactions on digital platforms. The equilibrium value of tokens is determined by aggregating heterogeneous users' transactional demand rather than discounting cashflows as in standard valuation models. Endogenous platform adoption builds upon user network externality and exhibits an $S$-curve - it starts slow, becomes volatile, and eventually tapers off. Introducing tokens lowers users' transaction costs on the platform by allowing users to capitalize on platform growth. The resulting intertemporal feedback between user adoption and token price accelerates adoption and dampens user-base volatility.
Selected presentations: CKGSB, RCFS/RAPS Conference at Baha Mar, Stanford SITE, UT Dallas Fall Finance Conference, U Zurich/ETH; by coauthors: Ant Financial (Alibaba Group), ASSA/AFE 2019, Atlanta Fed, CEPR ESSFM Gerzensee, Chicago Booth, Finance UC Chile, Georgetown McDonough, Finance Theory Group, SEC, Tsinghua, U Washington Foster; awards: AAM-CAMRI-CFA Institute Prize in Asset Management, CME Best Paper Award (Emerging Trends in Entrepreneurial Finance)
Edward Denbee, Christian Julliard, Kathy Yuan, Accepted at Journal of Financial Economics, Aug. 2020
Abstract: Using a structural model, we estimate the liquidity multiplier of an interbank network and banks’ contributions to systemic risk. To provide payment services, banks hold reserves. Their equilibrium holdings can be strategic complements or substitutes. The former arises when payment velocity is high and payments begets payments. The latter prevails when the opportunity cost of liquidity is large, incentivising banks to borrow neighbors’ reserves instead of holding their own. Consequently, the network can amplify or dampen individual shocks. Empirically, network topology explains cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ contribution to systemic risks while changes in the equilibrium type drive the time-series variation.
Selected presentations: Short-Term Funding Markets, Bank of Canada/Payments Canada, Macro Finance Society (Boston College), NBER Summer Institute, OSU Fisher; by coauthors: Bank of England, Fed/OFR Financial Stability Conference, LSE, SSE, WFA; grant: Foundation Banque de France Research Grant
intermediaries issue the majority of liquid securities, and nonfinancial firms
have become net savers, holding intermediaries' debt as cash. This paper shows
that intermediaries' liquidity creation stimulates growth -- firms hold their
debt for unhedgeable investment needs -- but also breeds instability through
procyclical intermediary leverage. Introducing government debt as a competing
source of liquidity is a double-edged sword: firms hold more liquidity in every
state of the world, but by squeezing intermediaries' profits and amplifying
their leverage cycle, public liquidity increases the frequency and duration of
intermediation crises, raising the likelihood of states with less liquidity
supplied by intermediaries. The latter force dominates and the overall impact
of public liquidity is negative, when public liquidity cannot satiate firms'
liquidity demand and intermediaries are still needed as the marginal liquidity
Selected presentations: European Finance Association 2020, Stanford SITE 2020
Selected presentations: HKUST Finance Symposium, Paris December Meeting (Best Paper Award); by coauthors: RCFS/RAPS Conference at Baha Mar, UT Dallas Fall Finance Conference, Econometric Society (North America), Northern Finance Association (NFA), Orebro Workshop on Predicting Asset Returns
with Chen Wang
Abstract: Delegation bears an intrinsic form of uncertainty. Investors hire managers for their superior models of asset markets, but delegation outcome is uncertain precisely because managers' model is unknown to investors. We model investors' delegation decision as a trade-off between asset return uncertainty and delegation uncertainty. Our theory explains several puzzles on fund performances. It also delivers asset pricing implications supported by our empirical analysis: (1) because investors partially delegate and hedge against delegation uncertainty, CAPM alpha arises; (2) the cross-section dispersion of alpha increases in uncertainty; (3) managers bet on alpha, engaging in factor timing, but factors' alpha is immune to the rise of their arbitrage capital - when investors delegate more, delegation hedging becomes stronger. Finally, we offer a novel approach to extract model uncertainty from asset returns, delegation, and survey expectations.
Selected presentations: ASU Sonoran Winter Conference, CEPR ESSFM Gerzensee, CUHK, European Winter Finance Summit, INSEAD, Stanford SITE, U Zurich